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Abstract 
This paper provides evidence of the broad government presence in the European venture capital 
industry. Two forms of intervention are considered: first, direct stand-alone government ven-
ture capital funds and, second, indirect private funds to which governments commit funds as 
limited partners. The overall government presence seems to be much more important than pre-
viously documented, as we find that the government intervenes, on average, in 42.2% of ven-
ture capital investments in Europe. We also show that European countries are heterogeneous 
in their use of these two channels, and we consider possible early explanations for this choice 
of policy mix. Lastly, we provide some evidence on the consequences of these policies in terms 
of SME’s perceived access to financing. 
1 Introduction 
This paper provides a bird’s eye view of the policy mix used in several European countries to 
support the national venture capital (VC) industry. Specifically, we focus on public VC invest-
ments made through two distinct channels. The first channel is that of direct investments, which 
are usually implemented by a stand-alone government-owned venture capital firm or fund 
(GVC) that invests in portfolio companies alone or in syndication with a private partner. Al-
ternatively, governments can also channel funds to start-ups indirectly by acting as a limited 
partner (LP) in privately managed venture capital funds (we call these initiatives GLPs).  
Public policies for VC have sparked an active theoretical and empirical debate. First of all, do 
governments actually need to intervene in the VC market in the first place? Lerner (2002, 1999) 
argued that government intervention can be justified by the presence of the so-called “equity 
gap”. This gap emerges from the lack of funding for entrepreneurs, whose projects are fraught 
with informational opaqueness and potential moral hazard issues. As a consequence, traditional 
fund providers such as banks refrain from financing such endeavors. Private venture capital 
(PVC), in this sense, can be seen as a solution. However, PVC investors have limited resources, 
implying that only a handful of entrepreneurial projects would eventually receive financing 
(Berger and Udell 1998). Therefore, a considerable number of potentially promising ventures 
may remain unfunded, and the shortage of capital may constrain their development and growth. 
McCahery et al. (2015) estimate that the equity gap for several European economies – as a 
percentage of GDP – ranges between 0.7% (for the Netherlands) and 13.05% (for Romania). 
It is therefore natural for government authorities to address this market failure (Brander et al. 
2015; Colombo et al. 2016), either by investing in companies that are adversely affected by the 
equity gap (as in the case of GVC), or by pumping more financial resources into the PVC 
market (as in the case of GLP). 
Extant literature has devoted substantial attention to the implications of GVC initiatives for 
both the VC industry as a whole and for portfolio companies. Regarding the former, the find-
ings are mixed. Leleux and Surlemont (2003) and Brander et al. (2015) find that GVC improves 
the supply side of the market and complements PVC, while Cumming and MacIntosh (2006) 
present evidence consistent with the argument that GVC outbids and crowds out PVC inves-
tors. A few studies have also revealed that GVC initiatives are able to attract PVC investments 
towards target companies that private VC usually neglects (Bertoni et al. 2018; Guerini and 
Quas 2016; Kovner and Lerner 2015). Additionally, the abundant literature that focuses on the 
impact of GVC on portfolio companies demonstrates the superior performance of the firms 
backed by either PVC alone or by syndicates of private and public funds vis-à-vis purely GVC-
backed firms (Alperovych et al. 2015; Bertoni and Tykvová 2015; Cumming et al. 2017; Grilli 
and Murtinu 2014).   
Several recent contributions have also analyzed the implications of the GLP form of public 
intervention. From a theoretical perspective, Jääskeläinen et al. (2007) analyze the profit dis-
tribution and compensation structures of GLP initiatives, concluding that they offer only a lim-
ited resolution of the equity gap market failure. The empirical literature has mainly focused on 
individual GLP initiatives, such as the European Investment Fund (Buzzacchi et al. 2013), the 
Australian Innovation Investment Funds (Cumming 2007; Cumming and Johan 2009) and the 
Flemish ARKimedes fund (Standaert and Manigart 2017); or on single countries, namely the 
United Kingdom (Munari and Toschi 2015) and South Korea (Lim and Kim 2015).  
In the present paper, we adopt a broader view of public intervention in the VC market. Unlike 
the papers mentioned above, we consider GVC and GLP initiatives simultaneously and adopt 
a macro perspective to study what factors influence the use of these channels in different Eu-
ropean countries. Governmental agencies play a much more important role in Europe than in 
other well developed VC markets, such as the USA (Kelly 2011). Moreover, as we demonstrate 
in this paper, Europe exhibits high heterogeneity in the policy mix used to support the VC 
industry. It is thus worth studying what influences such a mix.  
Taking inspiration from the literature that has studied which institutional factors influence the 
development of VC markets (Groh et al. 2010; Jeng and Wells 2000), in this paper, we study 
how economic factors and the quality of public institutions affect the use of GVC and GLP as 
policy initiatives. Moreover, we conduct a preliminary analysis to uncover which policy mix 
resulted in better financing conditions for European SMEs. 
To the best of our knowledge, no other study provides such an overview of the use of the two 
channels of public intervention in the VC market and their consequences on access to finance. 
In undertaking this analysis, this paper benefits from a new and unique hand-collected sample 
of investments made by GVC and GLP funds across 25 European countries during 1997-2015. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and section 3 
the model. Section 4 details the results. Section 5 concludes.  
2 Data  
To begin, we first identified a list of GVC programs and GLP funds operating in Europe. There 
is no single database that collects comprehensive information on any of those initiatives. There-
fore, we used information derived from different sources. 
For GVCs, we relied on four different databases: Thomson One, VICO, Capital IQ and 
PrivCo1. From Thomson One, we extracted a list of VC investors headquartered in European 
countries and classified as “Government Affiliated Programs”. From VICO (www.vicopro-
ject.org), which covers 7 European countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Italy 
and the United Kingdom), we selected VC investors classified as GVCs. Similarly to Brander 
et al. (2015), we identify GVC investors in Capital IQ as those European VC investors whose 
parent companies were owned by government entities. In PrivCo, we selected investors of the 
“Governmental” type that are located in Europe. We then merged the four lists of potential 
GVC investors and double-checked their governmental nature using information available on 
their websites. Overall, we identify 137 VC funds with governmental bodies as parents; we 
classify these funds as GVCs. They operate in 25 European countries. 
Our main source of information for the identification of GLP funds was the questionnaire sent 
by the OECD to 34 member countries in 2012 regarding the supply of seed and early stage 
financing, regulatory challenges and demand-side actions (OECD 2013). We complement this 
information using yearly OECD scoreboard reports on the financing of SMEs and entrepre-
neurs, the European Investment Fund (EIF) website, and European Venture Fund Investors 
Network (EVFIN) documentation. These documents provided us with a list of 35 suprana-
tional, national or regional government LPs based in 27 European countries. Further, we 
checked Capital IQ and scraped the websites2 and annual reports of these government LPs for 
                                                 
1 While Thomson One represents a good starting point for identifying GVC investors, it has some well-known 
shortfalls, as some GVCs are misclassified (Bertoni et al. 2015; Da Gbadji et al. 2015; Ivanov and Xie 2010). 
2 We also used the Wayback Machine (http://archive.org/web) to check historical web pages.  
their fund commitments. We also directly contacted those government LPs for which we could 
not find reliable information online.3 Lastly, we manually matched the GLP funds to funds in 
Thomson One based on the name and the nation of the fund. This gave us a list of 796 private 
VC funds that had received a commitment from at least one of the 35 government LPs. 
With these data in hand, we returned to Thomson One and downloaded all recorded VC invest-
ments between Jan 1, 1997 and Dec. 31, 2015 (55,627 investments). We then classified invest-
ments into three categories. GVC investments are those in which the VC investor appears in 
our list of GVC investors (5,423 investments, 9.74% of total). GLP investments are those car-
ried out by VC funds from our list of GLPs (10,738 investments, 19.30% of total). The remain-
ing investments are classified as purely private VC investments (PVC, 39,466 investments).  
We aggregate investment data at the fund nation-year level, obtaining the number of GVC, 
GLP and PVC investments in every nation and year. We exclude observations in which the 
number of both GLP and GVC investments was equal to 0 in the focal year and in all the 
previous years. With this procedure, we exclude Romania and Slovakia from our sample, as 
we could not retrieve information on GVC investments in these countries. Our final dataset is 
an unbalanced panel of 314 country-year observations, covering 25 countries during 19 years 
(1997-2015). The included countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land and the United Kingdom. We use this dataset to perform our macro-level analysis. 
3 Variables 
To study the determinants of the policy mix for supporting the VC industry, we used as de-
pendent variables three measures of the flow of public investments into the VC industry, de-
rived from Thomson One investment data. The first one, denoted “(GLP+GVC)/VC”, reports 
the number of direct (GVC) and indirect (GLP) government investments divided by the total 
number of VC investments in a given country-year.4 The two individual components 
“GLP/VC” and “GVC/VC” measure the proportion of investments made in a given country-
year via each channel separately. In an average year, European GVC and GLP funds make 
approximately 42.2% (median 36.1%) of investments in our sample countries. There is, how-
ever, a substantial difference between these channels. GVCs account, on average, for 12.5% 
(median 7.9%) of VC investments, while GLPs are involved, on average, in 29.7% (median 
24.8%) of VC investments. The univariate t-tests indicate that this difference is statistically 
significant and at the 1% level (t-stat = 9.844).  
The graphical representation of these patterns, reported in Figure 1 below, suggests a substan-
tial within-country heterogeneity. Some countries rely on GLP only (e.g., the Société National 
de Crédit et d’Investissement in Luxembourg), while in other countries, both channels are used 
in parallel.5 In the latter case, some nations use these initiatives as substitutes (e.g., Denmark 
or Portugal), i.e., in years when GVC activity is stronger, GLP activity is weaker, and vice-
                                                 
3 Eventually, we recovered fund commitments for all the listed GLPs, with the one exception of Caixa Capital, 
located in Portugal.  
4 We use the number of investments, as the amounts invested are not accurately reported in Thomson One. 
5 The Czech Republic launched its first GVC program, the Fondseed (www.fondseed.cz), in 2013. However, the 
program was abandoned before it could make its first investment (see http://www.business-
info.cz/cs/clanky/pozastaveni-projektu-seed-fond-50051.html, last accessed on 12/12/2017). 
versa. Other countries resort to both types of intervention simultaneously, as complements 
(e.g., Belgium, Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom). 
Figure 1: GLP and GVC activity by nation and year 
 
The high heterogeneity in the use of GVC and GLP across countries and years could be related 
to the economic settings and quality of public institutions that make decisions on the policy 
mix used to support the VC industry in these countries. To verify these conjectures, we relied 
on a set of independent variables. 
To account for the general extent of development of the VC market, we used the variable 
“VC/GDP”, measured as the number of VC investments (source: Thomson One) divided by 
national GDP (source: World Bank). We control for the real interest rates in the given country-
year (“Interest rate”, source: World Bank), which have been found to influence VC activity 
(Bellavitis 2016). VC financing can potentially be substituted by bank loans. Whether banks 
are more or less willing to provide loans to entrepreneurs seems to be related to the structure 
and competition of the banking industry (Black and Strahan 2002; Rice and Strahan 2010). 
Accordingly, we include the variable “Bank concentration”, measured by the time-varying na-
tional C3 concentration index available from the World Bank.6 The intensity of entrepreneur-
ship in a given country-year is proxied by the general unemployment levels, assuming that 
greater unemployment would trigger an increase in the supply of entrepreneurs and an appro-
priate government response. We use the variable “Unemployment %”, i.e., percentage of un-
employed in the total labor force in every country and year, also from the World Bank. We 
                                                 
6 As a robustness check, we use the domestic bank credit to the private sector over GDP as an alternative measure 
of debt availability (source: World Bank). The results are unchanged and available upon request.  
control for other forms of governmental support with variables capturing the national govern-
ment expenditures relative to GDP (“Government consumption/GDP”, source: World Bank) 
and the subsidies and other transfers as a percentage of governmental expense (“Public subsi-
dies”, source: World Bank). Lastly, we include a “Crisis dummy” to isolate the years 2009 to 
2011.7 
To assess the impact of the quality of government institutions on the policy mix for supporting  
VC, we use the variable “Quality of Public institutions”, which corresponds to the Public in-
stitutions pillar of the Global Competitiveness Indicator, developed yearly by the World Eco-
nomic Forum (WEF 2016).  
Arguably, the reason for governments to intervene in the VC industry is to solve the equity gap 
problem (Lerner 2002). We therefore also conduct a preliminary analysis on the consequences 
of the policy mix for supporting the VC industry on the availability of finance for companies. 
In order to do so, we rely on data extracted from the Survey on the access to finance of enter-
prises (SAFE) surveys, conducted by the European Central Bank and the European Commis-
sion with European SMEs since 2009. SAFE respondents are asked to express their opinion 
about whether financing conditions deteriorated, remained unchanged or improved in the last 
6 months. Specifically, we used as dependent variables the answers related to four conditions: 
the “Availability of Equity”, the “General Economy”, the availability of “Public Finance” and 
the “Willingness of Investors” to invest in their companies. Answers were aggregated at nation-
year level, for a total of 117 observations. Positive values of the variables imply that conditions 
overall improved, and vice-versa for negative values. We then regress these four dependent 
variables against “GLP/VC” and “GVC/VC”, as main independent variables, and the usual set 
of controls. 
Whenever appropriate, independent variables are one-year lagged with respect to the focal ob-
servation year. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table I.8 
Table I: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Median Min Max 
(GLP+GVC)/VC 314 0.422 0.234 0.361 0.005 1.000 
GLP/VC 314 0.297 0.235 0.248 0.000 1.000 
GVC/VC 314 0.125 0.143 0.079 0.000 0.853 
VC/GDP, lagged 314 0.264 0.268 0.190 0.003 1.756 
(continued next page) 
(continued) 
Variable N Mean SD Median Min Max 
Interest rate, lagged 314 3.715 2.922 3.571 -7.674 14.727 
Banks concentration, lagged 314 72.946 18.025 75.800 29.440 100.000 
Unemployment %, lagged 314 8.216 4.328 7.548 1.805 27.466 
Crisis dummy 314 0.115 0.319 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Government consumption/GDP, lagged 314 20.196 3.119 19.799 10.665 27.935 
                                                 
7 We do not include the year dummies in these models, as our panels are largely unbalanced. We did, however, 
run an additional robustness test that included the year or period dummies in all models, and we found the results 
to be unchanged. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
8 To save space, the correlation matrix is not reported but is available from the authors upon request. 
Public subsidies, lagged 314 60.784 22.301 62.238 14.476 138.381 
Quality of Public Institutions, lagged 314 4.942 0.791 5.096 3.081 6.177 
Availability of Equity 117 -0.002 0.168 0.016 -0.714 0.500 
General Economy 117 -0.192 0.283 -0.211 -0.769 0.489 
Public Finance 117 -0.199 0.189 -0.158 -0.762 0.163 
Willingness of Investors 117 -0.008 0.182 0.029 -0.644 0.333 
4 Results 
To analyze the relationships between the three main dependent variables (GLP+GVC)/VC, 
GLP/VC, and GVC/VC and the economic and institutional characteristics of European coun-
tries, we resort to fixed and random effects panel estimators. Fixed effect estimators remove 
the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, which may bias the results in the presence of endog-
enous unobservable variables. At the same time, unobserved country heterogeneity is probably 
also an important driver of the patterns of GLP and GVC investments. Random effects models 
allow this to be captured directly during the estimation. In all cases, we adjust the standard 
errors for the possible presence of heteroscedasticity using the White-robust estimate of the 
covariance matrix. The results are reported in Table II.9 
The first three specifications correspond to the random effects models, while the last three 
represent the fixed effect estimation. Specifications (I) and (IV) relate the general government 
intervention in the VC market (both GVC and GLP investments) to the various countries’ eco-
nomic characteristics and to the quality of public institutions variable. In both cases, we find 
that the real interest rates, the unemployment, the amount of government expenditures, and the 
amount of public subsidies statistically significantly affect the overall (direct and indirect) pro-
portion of government investments in the VC industry. Interest rates load negatively and at 1% 
significance levels in both the random and fixed effects models. Unemployment rate loads 
positively at 5% significance level in both models. Government expenditures load positively 
at the 1% and 5% significance levels in random and fixed effects models, respectively. Finally, 
the Public subsidies load positively at 5% significance level. 
Specifications (II), (III), (V), and (VI) offer an interesting and more nuanced view. It appears 
that the real interest rates have a negative effect on GLP and positive but insignificant effect 
on the GVC activities. In particular, a one-standard-deviation increase in real interest rates 
translates into approximately a 5.0% reduction in GLP investments (−0.017 ×2.92), and this 
effect is significant at the 1% level (specifications II and V). Government consumption seems 
to matter only for the GVC investment channel across models (III) and (VI). A one standard 
deviation increase in “Government Consumption/GDP” leads to a 2.8%-4.7% increase in GVC 
activity. On the contrary, unemployment positively affects only GLP activity (models II and 
V). A one-standard-deviation increase in “Unemployment %” leads to a 3.46% increase in GLP 
activity in both the fixed and random effects models, although this effect seems to be only 
marginally significant (at 10% precisely). 
                                                 
9 In the unreported robustness checks, we also estimated a Tobit model to take into consideration the fact that our 
dependent variable is truncated between 0 and 1. Furthermore, we also used a Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUREG) to take into account the correlation between our dependent variables GLP/VC, and GVC/VC. Results 
remained robust and available from the authors upon request. 
Table II: Determinants of the policy mix for supporting the VC industry 
The table shows the coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of random effects and fixed effects 
models, whose dependent variables are indicated in the first row of the table. Legend: * p-value<10%, ** p-
value<5%, *** p-value<1%. 
 Random effects  Fixed effects 
 I II III  IV V VI 
Dependent variable 
GLP+GVC
VC
 
GLP
VC
 
GVC
VC
  
GLP+GVC
VC
 
GLP
VC
 
GVC
VC
 
              
VC/GDP, lagged 0.013  -0.034  0.041   0.025  -0.032  0.058  
 (0.058)   (0.032)  (0.047)    (0.058)   (0.035)  (0.041)  
Interest rate, lagged -0.011 *** -0.017 *** 0.005   -0.011 *** -0.017 *** 0.007  
  (0.004)   (0.005)  (0.004)    (0.004)   (0.005)  (0.004)  
Banks concentration, lagged 0.000  -0.001  0.001   0.000  -0.001  0.001  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001)  
Unemployment %, lagged 0.006 ** 0.008 * -0.002   0.006 ** 0.008 * -0.002  
  (0.003)   (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.003)   (0.004)  (0.004)  
Crisis dummy 0.029  -0.013  0.047 *  0.017  -0.017  0.034  
  (0.027)   (0.015)  (0.027)    (0.026)   (0.014)  (0.028)  
Government consumption, lagged 0.022 *** 0.011  0.009 **  0.028 ** 0.013  0.015 ** 
  (0.008)   (0.010)  (0.004)    (0.010)   (0.013)  (0.006)  
Public subsidies, lagged 0.002 ** 0.001  0.001   0.003 ** 0.002  0.002  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.001)  
Quality of Public Institutions, lagged -0.052  -0.138 ** 0.056 *  -0.019  -0.151 * 0.132 * 
  (0.051)   (0.059)  (0.031)    (0.061)   (0.086)  (0.068)  
Constant 0.166  0.846 ** -0.5 ***  -0.239  0.78  -1.018 ** 
  (0.347)   (0.407)  (0.148)    (0.430)   (0.596)  (0.399)  
                           
Number of countries 25  25  25   25  25  25  
Number of observations 314  314  314   314  314  314  
R2 (overall) 0.012  0.05  0.071   0.001  0.035  0.054  
 (8 d.o.f.) 27.317 *** 77.708 *** 71.717 ***        
F (7 d.o.f.)        4.036 *** 9.252 *** 9.839 *** 
The quality of public institutions has no significant effect on the combined GVC and GLP 
activity. Taken separately, however, we observe that the quality of governments loads nega-
tively on the GLP channel, with 5% and 10% significance levels in the random and fixed effects 
models, respectively. At the same time, government quality has a positive and 10% significant 
effect on GVC investments. This finding is intriguing. The message emerging from virtually 
all recent findings on GVC structures suggests that governments should always assume a pas-
sive role and work together with private partners (see for instance Jääskeläinen et al., 2007, for 
GLPs and Alperovych et al., 2015, for GVCs). We find that poorer quality governments are 
more likely to do exactly this and engage in GLP activity. This is especially true in Central and 
Eastern European countries, where GLP initiatives were initiated by the European Commission 
and the European Investment Bank through the JEREMIE program (EIF 2012). At the same 
time, good quality governments (namely Nordic countries) seem to adopt a more direct ap-
proach and invest through GVC channels (for a similar result, see Murray and Cowling, 2014). 
On balance, although various types of government intervention have been identified in the 
literature (Colombo et al. 2016), different governments seem to use them to different extents. 
To further examine the implications of the quality of public authorities on the VC funding 
channels they prefer, we decompose the Quality of Public Institution index into its components. 
The results are reported in Table III. 
Table III: Determinants of the policy mix for supporting the VC industry – components 
of the Quality of Public Institutions index 
The table shows the coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of random effects and fixed effects 
models, whose dependent variables are indicated in the first row of the table. All models include the lagged 
variables “VC/GDP”, “Interest rate”, “Bank concentration”, “Unemployment %”, “Government consumption”, 
“Public subsidies” and the crisis dummy, plus the variable indicated in the first column and a constant. The 
dataset includes 314 observations. Legend: * p-value<10%, ** p-value<5%, *** p-value<1%. 
  Random effects  Fixed effects 
 I II III  IV V VI 
Dependent variable 
GLP+GVC
VC
 
GLP
VC
 
GVC
VC
  
GLP+GVC
VC
 
GLP
VC
 
GVC
VC
 
Property rights index, lagged -0.111 *** -0.123 *** 0.012   -0.084 ** -0.102 * 0.018  
  (0.034)   (0.044)   (0.020)    (0.037)   (0.059)   (0.050)  
R2 (overall) 0.049  0.106  0.071   0.014  0.071  0.042  
 (7 d.o.f.)  45.678 *** 97.696 *** 88.196 ***        
F (6 d.o.f.)        5.447 *** 12.92 *** 6.157 *** 
                                 
Ethics and Corruption index, 
lagged -0.006  -0.072  0.040 ** 
 
0.021  -0.080  0.101 ** 
  (0.040)   (0.048)   (0.016)    (0.054)   (0.069)   (0.039)  
R2 (overall) 0.01  0.039  0.060   0.000  0.022  0.038  
 (7 d.o.f.) 28.53 *** 73.879 *** 69.988 ***        
F (6 d.o.f.)        5.259 *** 9.762 *** 9.34 *** 
                                
Undue influence index, lagged -0.036  -0.103 ** 0.047   -0.006  -0.101  0.095 * 
  (0.033)   (0.045)   (0.031)    (0.033)   (0.064)   (0.052)  
R2 (overall) 0.016  0.061  0.067   0.001  0.042  0.05  
 (7 d.o.f.) 26.229 *** 72.451 *** 76.163 ***        
F (6 d.o.f.)        3.87 *** 9.048 *** 10.519 *** 
                               
Public sector performance in-
dex, lagged -0.052  -0.135 *** 0.054 * 
 
-0.039  -0.148 ** 0.109 * 
  (0.045)   (0.047)   (0.029)    (0.049)   (0.061)   (0.057)  
R2 (overall) 0.009  0.033  0.058   0.001  0.02  0.039  
 (7 d.o.f.) 27.766 *** 80.616 *** 73.752 ***        
F (6 d.o.f.)        3.708 *** 9.28 *** 11.119 *** 
                              
Security index, lagged 0.015  -0.046  0.055 *  0.030  -0.038  0.068  
  (0.057)   (0.061)   (0.032)    (0.061)   (0.066)   (0.040)  
R2 (overall) 0.013  0.042  0.113   0.002  0.019  0.092  
 (7 d.o.f.) 31.475 *** 76.235 *** 71.024 ***        
F (6 d.o.f.)        6.248 *** 9.41 *** 8.116 *** 
The Quality of Public Institutions index is based on the following five dimensions: the property 
rights index, ethics and corruption index, undue influence index, public sector performance 
index, and security index. We estimate the same models as above using the random and fixed 
effects but considering only one component of the Quality of Public Institutions index at a 
time. In Table III, we report the coefficients of the components and suppress the control vari-
ables (the same as in Table II) to save space. As before, the standard errors are White-robust. 
As in the composite index, we find that all components load negatively on GLP activity and 
positively on GVC activity. However, components differ in terms of significance. “Property 
rights index” and “Public sector performance index” components show the most significant 
and consistent coefficients across the random and fixed effects models. In an unreported esti-
mate, we included simultaneously all five index components in the regression, despite their 
high correlation. We find that these two indexes have the most significant effects. This result 
confirms that higher-quality public authorities adopt a more direct approach in their support of 
the VC market and prefer to intervene in the form of GVC programs. Moreover, better intel-
lectual property protection (captured by the property rights index) limit the use of government 
intervention in the VC market. This can be explained by the higher interest of private individual 
and institutional investors in the VC asset class due to the beneficial effect of stronger property 
rights on expected returns (Bruton et al. 2005). 
Our last set of analyses documents the preliminary evidence on the impact of GLP and GVC 
initiatives on the easiness with which companies can access finance. As argued above, the 
reason for governments to introduce VC programs (direct or indirect) is to resolve the equity 
gap issue advocated by Lerner (2002). The equity gap is directly related to the access to financ-
ing which the SAFE survey tracks since 2009. In Table IV below, we use fixed effects estima-
tors with robust standard errors to study the effect of GLP/VC, and GVC/VC on four dependent 
variables: “Availability of Equity”, “General Economy”, “Public Finance” and “Willingness 
of Investors”. We find positive and significant effects of GLP activity on all dependent varia-
bles with significance levels ranging from 5% to 1%. This suggests that GLP initiatives are an 
effective policy tool to improve companies’ access to finance. While the coefficient on the 
GVC/VC variable are positive across the models, it is only significant in Model IV, which has 
“Willingness of Investors” as dependent variable, at the 10% significance level. Explanations 
for the limited impact of GVC programs on the easiness with which companies can access 
finance have been identified in the empirical literature. For example, there is a possibility that 
GVC investments are captured by politically connected companies (Lerner 1999) or that GVC 
investors target companies that do not fit the investment mandate of resolving the equity gap 
(Johan et al. 2014). 
Table IV: Impact of the policy mix for supporting the VC industry on the easiness to 
access capital of SMEs. 
The table shows the coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of fixed effects models, whose dependent variables are indicated 
in the first row of the table. Legend: * p-value<10%, ** p-value<5%, *** p-value<1%. 
  I II III IV 
Dependent variable 
Availability of 
Equity 
General 
Economy 
Public 
Finance 
Willingness of in-
vestors 
         
GVC/VC, lagged 0.544  0.497  0.251  0.597 * 
  (0.397)   (0.339)   (0.271)   (0.327)  
GLP/VC, lagged 0.372 ** 0.540 ** 0.438 *** 0.394 ** 
  (0.151)   (0.197)   (0.145)   (0.147)  
VC/GDP, lagged -0.200  -0.131  -0.066  -0.425 * 
  (0.204)   (0.392)   (0.247)   (0.246)  
Interest rate, lagged 0.007  0.016  0.011  0.009  
  (0.010)   (0.016)   (0.011)   (0.013)  
Banks concentration, lagged 0.002  -0.001  0.000  0.000  
  (0.004)   (0.007)   (0.004)   (0.004)  
Unemployment %, lagged 0.012  0.009  -0.009  0.012  
  (0.012)   (0.016)   (0.011)   (0.011)  
Crisis dummy -0.096 ** -0.144  -0.069  -0.108 ** 
  (0.044)   (0.104)   (0.057)   (0.051)  
Government consumption, lagged 0.010  -0.015  -0.053  0.001  
  (0.030)   (0.058)   (0.036)   (0.032)  
Public subsidies, lagged -0.004 *** -0.010 *** -0.007 *** -0.003  
  (0.001)   (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.002)  
Quality of Public Institutions, lagged 0.169  0.109  0.191  0.060  
  (0.120)   (0.240)   (0.131)   (0.119)  
Constant -1.199  -0.004  0.326  -0.382  
  (1.096)   (1.601)   (1.104)   (0.870)  
                  
N of countries 25  25  25  25  
N of observations 117  117  117  117  
R2 0.081  0.075  0.150  0.075  
F (9 d.o.f.) 86.652 *** 56.151 *** 46.767 *** 29.544 *** 
                  
5 Conclusions 
This paper provides an overview of government VC activity in Europe, which we divide into 
direct and indirect activity depending on the channel used by various supranational, national 
and regional governments to fund entrepreneurial ventures. Most of the extant evidence at the 
macro level (often country-specific studies) focuses on the direct channel, i.e., investments by 
stand-alone government-backed venture capital funds (GVC). Here, we also consider invest-
ments made by funds sponsored by governments as limited partners (GLP). By doing so, we 
are able to provide an idea of the relative importance of GVC and GLP channels in the Euro-
pean VC industry. Further, we also provide some preliminary evidence on the effectiveness of 
both GVC and GLP channels. More specifically, we focus on the role of GVC and GLP activity 
in improving the easiness with which companies can access finance. We hereby contribute to 
the literature on the impact of different types of government intervention in VC markets 
(Colombo et al. 2016). 
We build on a novel hand-collected and unique sample of 137 GVC initiatives and 35 GLP 
programs in Europe during 1997-2015. First, our findings indicate a strong governmental pres-
ence in the European venture capital market. On average 42.2% of investments are made by 
funds directly and indirectly supported by European governments during our sample period. 
This is a much more important proportion than previously suggested (e.g., Bottazzi et al. 2004). 
More specifically, every year in European countries, 12.5% of investments are made by GVC 
programs, and an additional 29.7% are financed by GLP funds. Moreover, we find that Euro-
pean governments are heterogeneous in their policy mix for supporting the VC industry. Our 
preliminary evidence indicates that macro-economic factors and the quality of public institu-
tions are related to the use of the direct or indirect channels of government intervention in the 
VC industry. According to our results, better quality governments use a more direct GVC ap-
proach, while in countries with lower-quality governments, GLP initiatives, backed by EIF, 
seem to prevail. Second, we find that of both channels, only the GLP channel significantly 
improves companies’ access to finance. As such, our results suggest that the GLP channel is a 
more effective tool to improve companies’ access to finance. 
This early evidence uncovers a broad set of questions that have not been previously examined. 
First, we compare GVC and GLP initiatives at the macro level in terms of volume and their 
impact on improving access to finance, but a more thorough investigation of the differences 
between the two channels – in terms of their investment patterns and effectiveness in fulfilling 
governmental goals such as job creation – is still missing. Second, while we provide evidence 
on the frequency of the collaboration between PVC and different forms of government inter-
vention in the VC market, the consequences of such collaboration from the PVC perspective 
are not quite clear yet. Future research will hopefully shed light on these issues. 
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